After nearly 16 months of Sudan’s civil war, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) finds itself increasingly under pressure from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
To stave off its growing vulnerability, the Sudanese Transitional Sovereign Council (TSC) and its de facto leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan is seeking help from Russia. In exchange for supplies of weapons and ammunition from Moscow, the TSC expressed its readiness to grant Russia a long-sought after military base for logistics and refuelling on the Red Sea coast. The exchange occurred on 27 June at the 27th International Economic Forum in St. Petersburg, Russia.
Beyond the gains that may come with the deal for the TSC, analysts warn that a Kremlin alliance with SAF may prolong the civil war and provoke proxy wars on Sudanese soil.
A successful port deal will also see Russia play both sides in the Sudanese war. Since the war broke out, the Russia-backed mercenary Africa Corps, formerly Wagner Group, has given aid to the RSF. A Russian naval base on the Sudanese coast would set up a direct military partnership between the Kremlin and the SAF.
“This will aid Russia’s efforts to create a bloc of authoritarian, pro-Russian states across the Sahel,” says Liam Karr, an analyst with the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute focusing on the Sahel. “The Kremlin has strong partnerships with the juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger,” he says.
“Closer ties between Russia and Sudan would help align those countries with the pro-Russian regimes in the central Sahel.”
Bashir seeks Russian arms and protection from US
The idea of a Russian military outpost is not new. Ousted president Omar al-Bashir initiated talks on the deal in 2017 when he met President Vladimir Putin in Sochi. The offer includes setting up a military outpost to host four nuclear-powered navy ships and 300 Russian troops on the Sudanese coast. An array of other foreign naval bases line the coast.
In exchange, Moscow will provide Sudan with weapons, military equipment and protection from any US aggression, which al-Bashir accused of enabling the secession of South Sudan. The proposed deal has a 25-year term, with a clause that allows for an automatic extension for 10 years if neither side objects.
Sudan’s relations with Russia began to warm following US-imposed sanctions in the 1990s which targeted the country’s links with Osama bin Laden. To get around the sanctions, Bashir strengthened ties with Iran and Russia who supplied Sudan with weapons that fuelled fighting in the Darfur region between 2003-2007 – a conflict that also led to Bashir’s indictment by the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Bashir resisted arrest and needed an ally. “He needed the presence of a stronger foreign power in Sudan and the best option was clearly his old friend, Putin,” Musa Ibrahim*, a Khartoum-based political analyst who requested anonymity tells The Africa Report.
“But it was too late,” says Ibrahim. “Negotiations of the port deal ended when Bashir was deposed from power [in 2019].”
Putin looks to Sudan for Red Sea access to Sahel
In December 2021, the deal resurfaced again. But this time, the call for renewed talks came from Moscow and were addressed to both Burhan and the RSF’s leader General Mohamed Hamdan ‘Hemeti’ Dagalo.
With around 300 sanctions imposed on Russia by the US and the European Union, Putin’s interest in Africa was sharpened, as he presented the former Soviet power as a global force at the 2019 Russia-Africa summit. Meanwhile, the former Wagner Group made inroads in Mozambique, Libya, Central African Republic and Sudan.
It is not about stabilising Sudan, it is about SAF’s victory and Kremlin’s interest
“Something was still missing for Putin,” says Ibrahim. “For external control, he needed an assertive presence at the Red Sea coast, the Suez Canal region and the coast across the Horn of Africa,” he says. “The Western influence on the Sahel was beginning to wane, and Sudan has a clear geographical position to the western and eastern Sahel – this formed the internal gain for a Russian presence in Sudan.”
By February 2023, Russian and Sudanese officials had concluded the review of the port deal. But the agreement was stalled by the absence of a Sudanese civilian government and a legislative arm in disarray. When war broke out in April, the deal was not as much of a priority for either SAF or RSF, who were looking for political, military and resource control at the start of the fighting.
“The port deal is back in 2024, and we need to be very clear that is not about stabilising Sudan, it is about SAF’s victory and Kremlin’s interest,” says Joseph Siegle, director of research at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies.
‘It’s not about seeking a truce, it’s about more bloodshed,” he says. “It is not clear if the defences of SAF and RSF are getting weaker, but certainly, external aids are important for them.”
Ibrahim agrees: “In the port deal, Burhan’s demand for the Russian arms already tells us that this isn’t about seeking a truce, it is about a reinforcement for war.”
Since April 2023, the large-scale conflict between SAF and RSF has claimed more than 15,000 lives, and seen some 12 million people flee Sudan while an estimated 10 million people remain internally displaced, making it the world’s largest internally displaced population.
‘Mercenaries smuggling gold to fund Ukraine war’
While Putin often paints Russia as the country to liberate Africa from the grips of Western powers, Alex Vines, research director of the Africa Programme, Chatham House, says Russia has little resources to offer Africa. “It targets military juntas with deep security challenges,” he says.
Between 2018 and 2022, Russia accounted for 40% of Africa’s arms imports, making it the continent’s largest supplier of weapons. Since 2015, Russia has also signed military cooperation agreements with more than 40 African countries.
There are no provisions in the deal that will address the widespread human rights abuses
Ibrahim notes that Russia’s continued expansion through its mercenaries in Africa is yielding the wealth it needs to provide Moscow with the resources to continue its war in Ukraine. Between February 2022 and February 2023, Russian mercenary groups smuggled about $1.9bn in gold out of Sudan; nearly the value of Sudan’s legitimate mining output in 2022.
“Both Sudanese warlords control respective gold mines,” says Ibrahim. “The Russian mercenaries have been aiding Hemeti’s RSF. It is still not clear if a successful port deal will terminate this alliance,” he says.
Mohamed Siraj, Sudan’s ambassador to Russia told reporters in an interview that the TSC and the Russian foreign ministry are “currently reviewing the matter within the framework of our bilateral relations” with a favourable outcome expected.
Siegle remains pessimistic. “The deal has no provision for the right treatment of innocent civilians who have been greatly affected in the clashes,” he says. “There are no provisions in the deal that will address the widespread human rights abuses,” he says. “More destruction looms.”
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